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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
   
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 16-4159 
_______________ 
 
WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY, 
a Washington corporation, 
 Appellant  
 
v. 
 
DOMTAR CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation; 
DOMTAR PAPER COMPANY, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company 
___ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
of Delaware 
 (1-14-cv-00024) 
District Judge:  The Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 15, 2017 
 
Before:  VANASKIE, RENDELL, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: January 18, 2018) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION∗ 
_________ 
                                              
∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff-Appellant Weyerhaeuser Company (“Weyerhaeuser”) sold its fine paper 
business to Defendants-Appellees Domtar Corporation and Domtar Paper Company, LLC 
(together “Domtar”) in 2007 for $3.3 billion (the “Sale”).  This case stems from a 
contract dispute over which party is responsible for paying the workers compensation 
claims of Weyerhaeuser’s former employees who had left prior to the Sale and thus had 
never worked for Domtar (the “Retired Workers”).  Weyerhaeuser appeals the District 
Court’s partial grant of Domtar’s motion to dismiss and its grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Domtar.  For the reasons explained below, we affirm. 
I. 
 As we write only for the parties, a summary of only the relevant facts is necessary.  
Shortly after the Sale closed in 2007, Weyerhaeuser and Domtar disputed which party 
was responsible for the workers compensation claims of the Retired Workers.  In April of 
2007, Weyerhaeuser tendered a workers compensation liability demand of over $13 
million to Domtar, which Domtar rejected.  Weyerhaeuser argued that under the Sale 
contracts, such claims were Domtar’s responsibility.  Weyerhaeuser also began to invoice 
Domtar for claims including payments to the Retired Workers.  Nonetheless, 
Weyerhaeuser made the payments until the issue was resolved.   
The parties engaged in negotiations regarding various post-closing disputes.  Their 
discussions resulted in a meeting in Montreal in September 2008 where Domtar took the 
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position that under the Sale contracts, it was not liable for the Retired Workers’ claims.1  
Weyerhaeuser preliminarily agreed, but stated it would need to discuss the matter 
internally more fully.   
 Following these discussions, Weyerhaeuser adjusted its own accounting records to 
show a decrease in income of over $9.2 million to reflect that Domtar would not be 
covering the cost of the Retired Workers’ claims.  Weyerhaeuser then provided Domtar 
new invoices reflecting that Domtar was not liable to Weyerhaeuser for claims for 
Retired Workers.  The error with the initial invoices was confirmed by the general 
counsel of its Canadian subsidiary, Anne Giardini, in a letter to Domtar.  The letter, 
marked “WITHOUT PREJUDICE” in the header on the first page, stated “we are all 
agreed that US workers compensation liability went to Domtar only for employees who 
became able to work in some capacity at Domtar.”  For three years, Weyerhaeuser 
continued to invoice Domtar for the claims of only these continuing employees.  In 2012, 
Weyerhaeuser realized its mistake in interpreting the contract and began tendering the 
workers compensation claims of Retired Workers to Domtar.  Domtar rejected this 
demand and the litigation ensued. 
Weyerhaeuser commenced this action for breach of contract in the District Court 
for the District of Delaware to recover the money it had paid.2  On Domtar’s motion to 
                                              
1 The Sale was executed in two contracts; the Amended and Restated Contribution 
Agreement (the “Contribution Agreement”) is the focus of this appeal. 
2 Diversity jurisdiction existed in the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).  
Weyerhaeuser is a citizen of Washington and Domtar is a citizen of Delaware.  The 
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.  We have jurisdiction to review the District 
Court’s final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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dismiss, the District Court held that Domtar was contractually responsible for the workers 
compensation claims of the Retired Workers.  It further ruled that the statute of 
limitations barred Weyerhaeuser from seeking recovery for Retired Workers’ workers 
compensation claims that accrued prior to January 13, 2011.3  Following discovery, 
Domtar moved for summary judgment arguing that Weyerhaeuser had waived its 
contractual rights in the payments it had made and that it had acquiesced to Domtar’s 
interpretation of the contracts.  The District Court agreed and granted its motion for 
summary judgment.  This appeal followed.   
II. 
 We address four issues on this appeal, stemming from both the District Court’s 
July 2014 opinion denying in part and granting in part Domtar’s motion to dismiss, and 
its August 2016 opinion granting Domtar’s motion for summary judgment.  They are: (1) 
whether a signed writing was required to waive any rights under the Sale contracts; (2) 
whether Weyerhaeuser intentionally waived its rights when it acted in accordance with 
Domtar’s incorrect interpretation of the Sale contracts; (3) whether—assuming 
Weyerhaeuser did waive its rights—it retracted this waiver in 2012; and (4) whether the 
parties’ agreements to resolve their disputes concerning workers compensation claims at 
a later date tolled the statute of limitations.4  These issues will be addressed in turn. 
                                              
3 Under Delaware law, breach of contract claims are subject to a three-year statute of 
limitations.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. X, § 8106(a).   
4 Given that we will affirm the District Court’s decision regarding waiver, we need not 
address whether the District Court properly determined the acquiescence issues as they 
are moot. 
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1. Signed Writing Requirement under the Sale Contracts 
Section 9.10 of the Contribution Agreement states that “[n]o provisions of this 
Agreement . . . shall be deemed waived, amended, supplemented or modified by any 
party, unless such waiver, amendment, supplement or modification is in writing.”  
Weyerhaeuser asserts that, contrary to what the District Court found, this clause means 
that it could not have waived or acquiesced to any loss of contractual rights against 
Domtar absent an additional writing. 
The District Court properly noted that under Delaware law “contract provisions 
deeming oral modifications unenforceable can be waived orally or by a course of conduct 
just like any other contractual provision.”5  Weyerhaeuser now argues, however, that 
Domtar cannot establish Weyerhaeuser’s intent to modify Section 9.10 with the required 
“specificity and directness as to leave no doubt of the intention of the parties to change 
what they had previously solemnized by formal document.”6  This is not the case.  Such 
intent is easily established by Weyerhaeuser’s conduct subsequent to the Sale.7   
The facts here establish that following Weyerhaeuser’s adoption of Domtar’s 
position regarding liability for the Retired Workers’ claims, Weyerhaeuser engaged in a 
                                              
5 Eureka VII, LLC v. Niagara Falls Holdings, LLC, 899 A.2d 95, 109 n. 26 (Del. Ch. 
2006) (citing Continental Ins. Co. v. Rutledge & Co., 750 A.2d 1219 (Del. Ch. 2000)). 
6 Continental Ins. Co., 750 A.2d at 1230. 
7 The same facts which establish Weyerhaeuser’s waiver of its underlying substantive 
rights against Domtar also establish its clear intent to modify the Section 9.10 writing 
requirement.  Because Weyerhaeuser’s conduct clearly establishes its intent to waive its 
rights regarding the Retired Workers, something it could not do absent modifying Section 
9.10, that same conduct must necessarily be understood to serve as a modification of 
Section 9.10’s writing requirement. 
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course of conduct clearly establishing an intent to waive its rights under the contract.8  
The District Court was correct in stating that “[o]ver the course of several years, 
Weyerhaeuser’s legal, finance, and human resources departments engaged in a 
continuous, conscious, and voluntary course of action consistent with Domtar’s 
interpretation of Section 2.03(a) and inconsistent with its own rights.”9  Viewing these 
facts together, Weyerhaeuser’s conduct leaves no alternative but to conclude that it had 
specifically and directly intended to waive its rights.10  Thus, we will affirm the District 
Court in its holding that Weyerhaeuser waived the signed writing requirement of the 
Contribution Agreement. 
                                              
8 First, Weyerhaeuser began adjusting its own internal accounting records so as to reflect 
that Weyerhaeuser no longer expected Domtar to pay for the Retired Workers’ claims.  
Second, Weyerhaeuser communicated to Domtar that it was accepting Domtar’s 
interpretation of the contract, specifically the definition of “transferred employee[s].”  
Third, Weyerhaeuser employees discussed changing invoices sent to Domtar to reflect 
that Domtar would only be responsible for the claims of employees who worked for 
Domtar; in other words, not the Retired Workers.   
9 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Domtar Corp., 204 F. Supp. 3d 731, 743 (D. Del. 2016). 
10 In any event, here there was indeed a signed writing waiving said rights, namely 
Giardini’s November 26 letter.  This letter confirmed that the required authorities at 
Weyerhaeuser had agreed with Domtar’s interpretation of the liability for Retired 
Workers.  Weyerhaeuser argues now, as it did before the District Court, that Giardini’s 
use of a “WITHOUT PREJUDICE” label on the letter forecloses any reliance on the 
contents of the letter.  The District Court disagreed for two main reasons.  First it found 
that Delaware courts disfavor such reliance on boilerplate markings.  Weyerhaeuser, 204 
F. Supp 3d at 742-43 (citing Balin v. Amerimar Realty Co., No. 12896, 1995 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 41, 1t *24-26 (Del. Ch. Apr. 10, 1995)). Second, it noted that while some sections 
of the letter lend themselves to being understood as a negotiating point, the discussion of 
the liability for the Retired Workers read more in terms of a confirmation of Domtar’s 
interpretation as discussed at the Montreal meeting.  Id. at 743.  Thus, the District Court 
concluded that “the court has no legal basis to hold that a single, boilerplate disclaimer on 
Giardini’s November 26 letter is sufficient, by itself, to outweigh Weyerhaeuser’s 
multitude of oral and written statements and years of conduct consistent with Domtar’s 
interpretation of Section 2.03(a).”  Id.  We agree with the District Court’s conclusion. 
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2. Weyerhaeuser’s Waiver of its Rights 
 Weyerhaeuser also argues that the District Court erred in finding waiver because 
there was no evidence of intent to waive its substantive rights against Domtar and 
because it had no knowledge of its rights.  Delaware law defines waiver as “the voluntary 
and intentional relinquishment of a known right.”11  As discussed above, the District 
Court did not err in determining that Weyerhaeuser intended to waive its rights against 
Domtar; Weyerhaeuser’s actions clearly demonstrate such intent.  Thus, we turn to 
analyzing whether the District Court properly found that Weyerhaeuser had knowledge of 
its rights.   
 Weyerhaeuser relies chiefly on Moore v. Travelers Indem. Ins. Co., a case the 
District Court already properly disregarded as distinguishable.12  While the Moore court 
did state that “[t]he requisite intention to establish a waiver cannot be found in mistake,” 
the mistake made there was the erroneous one-time issuance of a check for just over 
$1,000.13  Here, by stark contrast, the “mistake” was a multi-year course of conduct.  We 
agree with the District Court that this case is closer to Julian v. Eastern States 
Construction Serv., Inc.  In Julian, a contract provision was held to be waived where 
there was “at least an arguable basis” that the waiving party—which argued it lacked the 
knowledge required for waiver—was aware of its rights under the contract.14  Here, 
                                              
11 AeroGlobal Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Cirrus Indus., 871 A.2d 428, 444 (Del. 2005) 
(citation omitted).  
12 408 A.2d 298, 302 (Del. Super. 1979). 
13 Id. at 301-02. 
14 No. 1892-VCP, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 86, at *54-*55 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2008) 
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Weyerhaeuser was—for years—clearly aware that there was “at least an arguable basis” 
that Domtar was obligated to pay the claims of the Retired Workers.  Indeed, it had 
initially argued as much before accepting Domtar’s position to the contrary.  
Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that Weyerhaeuser waived its substantive 
rights. 
3. Retraction of Waiver 
 Weyerhaeuser next argues that, assuming it had waived its rights, it had properly 
retracted its waiver by 2012, making Domtar liable for the Retired Workers’ workers 
compensation claims beyond that point.  The District Court held that the waiver had not 
been properly retracted “because Weyerhaeuser unjustifiably delayed in giving 
reasonable notice to Domtar” of its intent to retract its waiver.15  
On appeal, the parties dispute the applicable law regarding the retraction of 
waiver.16  Because Weyerhaeuser cannot establish that the facts here satisfy the 
Amirsaleh test for retraction of waiver, we need not address the interplay of these cases.  
In Amirsaleh, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that while retraction of waiver is 
typically prohibited, “the waiving party may retract the waiver by giving reasonable 
                                              
15 Weyerhaeuser, 204 F. Supp. 3d at 745. 
16 Weyerhaeuser argues that the Delaware Supreme Court established a test for the 
retraction of waiver in Amirsaleh v. Bd. of Trade of the City of New York and that the 
District Court erred by considering the timelines of the retraction.  27 A.3d 522 (Del. 
2011).  In contrast, Domtar asserts that the section of Amirsaleh relied upon by 
Weyerhaeuser was dicta and that the operative rule should then be the one announced in a 
previous Delaware Supreme Court case, Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Church Ins. Co., where it 
was held that “[o]nce a right is waived, it is gone forever.”  892 A.2d 356, 364 (Del. 
2005). 
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notice to the non-waiving party before that party has suffered prejudice or materially 
changed his position.”17  Here, it cannot be said that Weyerhaeuser gave reasonable 
notice.  As the District Court properly noted, Weyerhaeuser waited over three years from 
when it became aware of the facts necessary to discover the interpretive mistake the 
parties had made.18  Accordingly, we affirm the District Court in its determination that 
Weyerhaeuser did not properly retract its waiver.  
4. Tolling of the Statute of Limitations 
 Finally, Weyerhaeuser argues that the District Court erred in its July 2014 opinion 
by dismissing Weyerhaeuser’s claims that accrued prior to January 2011.  Weyerhaeuser 
claims that the District Court failed to properly account for two contracts in which 
Weyerhaeuser and Domtar agreed to toll the statute of limitations.  Domtar opposes this, 
asserting that not only do the contracts Weyerhaeuser points to not constitute an 
agreement to toll the statute of limitations, but that neither contract even mentions the 
statute of limitations at all. 
 While Weyerhaeuser is correct that Delaware law allows for tolling agreements, 
for such an agreement to be effective it must be just that—an agreement.  Neither 
contract Weyerhaeuser points to can reasonably be understood to be an agreement to toll 
the statute of limitations.19  Moreover, the case Weyerhaeuser cites to in support of its 
                                              
17 27 A.3d at 530.   
18 Weyerhaeuser, 204 F. Supp. 3 at 744. 
19 Weyerhaeuser’s brief refers to both the Settlement Agreement, effective December 21, 
2009, and the Agreement to Terminate Certain Health and Welfare Transition Services, 
executed on February 28, 2013.  Weyerhaeuser Br. at 34. 
10 
 
assertion that the contract did toll the statute of limitations, E.I. du Pont Nemours & Co. 
v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., is entirely inapposite.20  There, the contract asserted to have 
tolled the statute of limitations was literally referred to as the “Tolling Agreement” and it 
specifically stated that “the running of any statute of limitations . . . [is] hereby tolled.”21  
Here, by contrast, there are no references to the statute of limitations in either agreement.  
Accordingly, we affirm the partial dismissal.    
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s order granting in part 
Domtar’s motion to dismiss and the District Court’s order granting Domtar summary 
judgment.  
                                              
20 C.A. No. N10C-09-058, 2013 Del. Super. LEXIS 9 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2013), as 
corrected (Jan. 29, 2013).   
21 Id. at *29.   
